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Postcolonialism	  
Rahul	  Rao	  	  [Forthcoming	  in	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Political	  Ideologies,	  eds.	  Michael	  Freeden,	  Marc	  Stears,	  Lyman	  Tower	  Sargent	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2012)]	  	  	  Writing	  in	  1992	  about	  the	  ‘pitfalls	  of	  the	  term	  “post-­‐colonialism”’,	  Anne	  McClintock	  places	  it	  in	  the	  cacophonous	  company	  of	  other	  ‘post’	  words	  in	  the	  culture	  of	  the	  time—‘post-­‐colonialism,	  post-­‐modernism,	  post-­‐structuralism,	  post-­‐cold	  war,	  post-­‐marxism,	  post-­‐apartheid,	  post-­‐Soviet,	  post-­‐Ford,	  post-­‐feminism,	  post-­‐national,	  post-­‐historic,	  even	  post-­‐contemporary’—the	  enthusiasm	  for	  which	  she	  reads	  as	  a	  symptom	  of	  ‘a	  global	  crisis	  in	  ideologies	  of	  the	  future,	  particularly	  in	  the	  ideology	  of	  “progress”’	  (McClintock	  1992:	  93).	  The	  collapse	  of	  both	  capitalist	  and	  communist	  teleologies	  of	  development	  in	  the	  debt-­‐wracked	  Third	  World	  seemed	  to	  conspire	  with	  postmodernist	  critiques	  of	  metanarrative	  to	  discredit	  not	  only	  particular	  articulations	  of	  ‘progress’	  but	  also	  the	  very	  enterprise	  of	  charting	  a	  ‘progressive’	  politics.	  Setting	  themselves	  resolutely	  against	  a	  past	  that	  they	  are	  determined	  to	  transcend,	  ‘post’	  words	  drift	  in	  a	  present	  that	  seems	  allergic	  to	  thinking	  about	  the	  future.	  	  	  Writing	  in	  2004	  and	  looking	  back	  on	  nearly	  three	  decades	  of	  ‘postcolonial	  studies’	  in	  the	  academy,	  Neil	  Lazarus	  traces	  a	  significant	  shift	  in	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  ‘postcolonial’.	  Originally	  used	  in	  a	  strictly	  temporal	  sense	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  period	  immediately	  after	  decolonization	  (‘post’	  as	  ‘after’),	  Lazarus	  cites	  a	  markedly	  different	  usage	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Homi	  Bhabha	  for	  whom	  ‘“postcolonial”	  is	  a	  fighting	  term’,	  invoked	  in	  polemics	  against	  colonialism	  but	  also	  against	  anti-­‐colonial	  discourses	  such	  as	  Marxism	  and	  nationalism	  that	  are	  disavowed	  on	  account	  of	  their	  essentialism	  and	  deconstructed	  in	  the	  vocabulary	  of	  poststructuralism	  (Lazarus	  2004:	  4).	  In	  Lazarus’s	  retrospective	  view,	  what	  McClintock	  saw	  at	  the	  time	  as	  ideology	  in	  flux	  begins	  to	  look	  more	  like	  an	  ideology	  of	  flux.	  The	  ‘post’	  in	  ‘postcolonial’	  begins	  to	  signify	  not	  merely	  (or	  even	  necessarily)	  ‘after’,	  but	  ‘anti’:	  a	  periodizing	  or	  historical	  term	  has	  become	  an	  ideological	  concept.	  	  	  This	  chapter	  attempts	  to	  illuminate	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  ‘fight’	  between	  postcolonialism	  and	  its	  ideological	  antagonists.	  It	  proceeds	  to	  do	  this	  in	  three	  parts.	  First,	  it	  outlines	  some	  of	  the	  defining	  features	  of	  postcolonialism	  as	  an	  ideological	  discourse.	  There	  is	  some	  irony	  here	  in	  that	  while	  postcolonialism,	  as	  it	  emerged	  in	  the	  work	  of	  its	  leading	  practitioners	  under	  the	  sign	  of	  colonial	  discourse	  analysis,	  began	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  ideology,	  its	  professed	  normative	  commitments	  have	  made	  it	  available	  as	  an	  object	  for	  ideological	  analysis.	  While	  postcolonialism	  has	  been	  attacked	  from	  both	  right	  and	  left,	  it	  is	  its	  engagements	  with	  Marxist	  and	  poststructuralist	  criticism	  that	  have	  been	  most	  productive	  of	  its	  further	  development.	  Accordingly,	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  chapter	  will	  focus	  on	  this	  engagement.	  Responding	  to	  this	  critique,	  the	  third	  part	  of	  the	  chapter	  locates	  postcolonial	  theory	  within	  a	  longer	  tradition	  of	  anticolonial	  thought,	  whose	  ambivalent	  relationship	  with	  the	  universalistic	  categories	  of	  colonial	  discourse	  
accounts	  for	  much	  of	  the	  contemporary	  ideological	  debate	  between	  postcolonialism	  and	  its	  critics.	  	  	  	  
I:	  The	  making	  of	  an	  ideology	  	   	  
Orient/Occident	  	  	  ‘Postcolonial	  studies’	  as	  an	  academic	  field	  is	  conventionally	  dated	  to	  the	  publication	  of	  Edward	  Said’s	  Orientalism	  in	  1978.	  The	  signal	  achievement	  of	  this	  work	  is	  its	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  colonial	  encounter	  as	  entailing	  not	  only	  the	  physical	  violence	  of	  military	  conquest	  and	  economic	  exploitation,	  but	  also	  an	  epistemic	  violence	  enacted	  by	  particular	  forms	  of	  knowledge	  tethered	  to	  imperial	  power.	  Said	  named	  this	  cognitive	  dimension	  of	  Western	  imperialism	  ‘Orientalism’—a	  term	  that	  he	  defines	  in	  three	  ways	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  eponymously	  named	  book.	  In	  its	  most	  obvious	  sense,	  Orientalism	  names	  a	  field	  of	  academic	  enquiry	  encompassing	  anyone	  who	  teaches,	  writes	  about,	  or	  researches	  the	  ‘Orient’.	  Second,	  Orientalism	  is	  a	  ‘style	  of	  thought’	  based	  upon	  an	  ontological	  and	  epistemological	  distinction	  made	  between	  ‘the	  Orient’	  and	  ‘the	  Occident’.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Orientalism	  names	  a	  Western	  tendency	  to	  dichotomize	  the	  world	  into	  a	  series	  of	  us/them	  contrasts	  and	  to	  essentialize	  the	  resultant	  ‘other’,	  so	  that	  the	  backward,	  savage,	  benighted	  Orient	  is	  seen	  to	  confront	  the	  developed,	  rational,	  enlightened	  Occident	  in	  a	  Manichean	  opposition	  of	  civilizational	  proportions.	  Third,	  from	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  century	  onwards,	  ‘Orientalism	  can	  be	  discussed	  and	  analyzed	  as	  the	  corporate	  institution	  for	  dealing	  with	  the	  Orient—dealing	  with	  it	  by	  making	  statements	  about	  it,	  authorizing	  views	  of	  it,	  describing	  it,	  by	  teaching	  it,	  settling	  it,	  ruling	  over	  it:	  in	  short,	  Orientalism	  as	  a	  Western	  style	  for	  dominating,	  restructuring,	  and	  having	  authority	  over	  the	  Orient’	  (Said	  1985:	  2-­‐3).	  As	  such,	  Orientalism	  articulates	  a	  relationship	  of	  knowledge	  to	  power	  that	  is	  both	  instrumental	  (to	  rule	  them	  you	  have	  to	  know	  them)	  and	  constitutive,	  producing	  the	  putative	  reality	  (the	  ‘Orient’)	  that	  it	  describes.	  Enabled	  by	  the	  brute	  material	  superiority	  of	  European	  imperial	  power,	  the	  production	  of	  Orientalist	  knowledge	  also	  comes	  to	  function	  as	  an	  enabler	  of	  such	  power	  by	  legitimating	  imperial	  rule	  in	  the	  guise	  of	  a	  civilizing	  mission.	  	  	  Borrowing	  Michel	  Foucault’s	  notion	  of	  discourse	  as	  a	  pattern	  of	  statements	  to	  which	  specialized	  knowledge	  must	  conform	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  true	  (Foucault	  2002:	  131),	  Said	  argues	  that	  the	  Western	  discourse	  of	  Orientalism	  has	  been	  remarkably	  consistent	  across	  time.	  As	  a	  ‘style	  of	  thought’,	  Said’s	  account	  of	  Orientalism	  accommodates	  figures	  of	  European	  classical	  antiquity	  such	  as	  Homer,	  Aeschylus	  and	  Euripides,	  through	  Dante	  and	  Marx,	  to	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  British	  and	  French	  orientalists,	  their	  twentieth	  century	  US	  counterparts	  and	  indeed	  contemporary	  popular	  culture.	  It	  ranges	  across	  an	  array	  of	  texts	  including	  literature,	  poetry,	  drama,	  travel	  writing,	  anthropology,	  economics	  and	  administration.	  Perhaps	  most	  crucially,	  it	  operates	  across	  ideologies	  taking	  within	  its	  sweep	  not	  only	  those	  committed	  to	  imperialism	  but	  also	  those	  like	  Marxism	  that	  are	  self-­‐consciously	  anti-­‐imperialist.	  Thus,	  while	  noting	  Marx’s	  sympathy	  for	  the	  misery	  inflicted	  by	  Britain	  on	  its	  Indian	  subjects,	  Said	  indicts	  Marx	  as	  an	  Orientalist—the	  term	  now	  bearing	  
only	  a	  pejorative	  sense,	  thanks	  in	  no	  small	  part	  to	  Said’s	  text.	  Citing	  Marx’s	  observation	  that	  while	  England	  might	  be	  driven	  by	  the	  ‘vilest	  interests’,	  it	  ‘has	  to	  fulfil	  a	  double	  mission	  in	  India:	  one	  destructive,	  the	  other	  regenerating—the	  annihilation	  of	  the	  Asiatic	  society,	  and	  the	  laying	  of	  the	  material	  foundations	  of	  Western	  society	  in	  Asia’,	  Said	  remarks	  that	  ‘the	  idea	  of	  regenerating	  a	  fundamentally	  lifeless	  Asia	  is	  a	  piece	  of	  pure	  Romantic	  Orientalism’,	  conforming	  to	  the	  persistent	  logic	  of	  the	  colonial	  civilizing	  mission	  (Said	  1985:	  153-­‐6).	  While	  this	  repudiation	  of	  Marx	  in	  a	  foundational	  text	  of	  postcolonialism	  warrants	  further	  scrutiny,	  suffice	  it	  to	  say	  that	  the	  staggering	  range	  of	  Said’s	  account	  of	  Orientalism	  as	  a	  discourse	  operative	  across	  time,	  texts	  and	  ideologies—indeed	  as	  the	  constitutive	  discourse	  of	  Western	  civilization—made	  the	  argument	  a	  provocative	  intervention	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  and	  humanities.	  	  Unsurprisingly,	  Orientalism	  attracted	  a	  large	  number	  of	  critical	  responses.	  Some	  objected	  that	  Said’s	  account	  of	  Orientalism	  was	  too	  monolithic	  in	  its	  focus	  on	  negative	  stereotypes	  and	  its	  neglect	  of	  affirmative	  tropes	  that	  were	  also	  a	  feature	  of	  the	  colonial	  archive.	  The	  Syrian	  philosopher	  Sadik	  Jalal	  al-­‐‘Azm	  argued	  that	  Said	  was	  guilty	  of	  reverse	  essentialism,	  opening	  himself	  up	  the	  charge	  of	  Occidentalism	  and	  in	  the	  process	  reifying	  the	  very	  East/West	  dichotomy	  that	  he	  had	  set	  out	  to	  deconstruct	  (Lockman	  2004:	  195-­‐8).	  In	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  polemic	  against	  Said’s	  oeuvre	  as	  a	  whole,	  the	  Marxist	  literary	  critic	  Aijaz	  Ahmad	  took	  Said	  to	  task	  for	  failing	  to	  identify	  capitalism	  as	  the	  structure	  that	  gives	  European	  prejudices	  against	  the	  extra-­‐European	  world	  such	  devastating	  consequences.	  In	  particular,	  Ahmad	  defended	  Marx	  against	  the	  charge	  of	  Orientalism,	  noting	  that	  Marx’s	  view	  of	  British	  colonialism	  in	  India	  as	  playing	  a	  progressive	  role	  in	  sweeping	  away	  the	  remnants	  of	  ‘Oriental	  despotism’	  is	  analogous	  to	  his	  view	  of	  capitalism	  as	  dismantling	  the	  vestiges	  of	  feudalism	  in	  Europe	  (Ahmad	  1994:	  225).	  Moreover,	  Marx	  emphatically	  endorsed	  the	  right	  of	  Indians	  to	  resist	  colonialism,	  observing	  that	  while	  the	  British	  bourgeoisie	  were	  simply	  laying	  the	  ‘material	  premises’	  for	  the	  development	  of	  India’s	  productive	  powers,	  the	  full	  realization	  of	  those	  powers	  would	  require	  a	  proletarian	  revolution	  in	  Britain	  or	  an	  anti-­‐colonial	  one	  in	  India	  (Marx	  2000:	  365).	  	  But	  it	  is	  perhaps	  Said’s	  engagement	  with	  poststructuralism	  that	  has	  attracted	  the	  greatest	  attention	  from	  both	  sympathetic	  and	  critical	  commentators	  alike	  (see	  for	  example	  Clifford	  1988).	  Orientalism	  disavows	  any	  interest	  in,	  or	  capacity	  for,	  demonstrating	  what	  more	  accurate	  representations	  of	  the	  ‘Orient’	  might	  look	  like.	  Indeed,	  there	  are	  deeply	  poststructuralist	  moments	  in	  the	  text	  when	  Said	  doubts	  whether	  there	  can	  be	  ‘true’	  representations	  of	  anything,	  noting	  that	  all	  representations	  are	  embedded	  in	  the	  language,	  culture,	  institutions	  and	  ‘political	  ambience’	  of	  the	  speaker	  (Said	  1985:	  272).	  Yet	  there	  are	  other	  moments	  when	  he	  insists	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  ‘scholarship	  that	  is	  not	  as	  corrupt,	  or	  at	  least	  as	  blind	  to	  human	  reality’	  as	  Western	  orientalism	  is	  (ibid:	  326).	  In	  making	  these	  apparently	  contradictory	  claims,	  Said	  borrows	  the	  Foucauldian	  notion	  of	  discourse	  as	  constraining	  what	  can	  be	  said	  within	  a	  discipline,	  without	  pushing	  it	  to	  the	  logical	  extremes	  that	  Foucault	  does.	  Paraphrasing	  Marx’s	  view	  of	  men	  and	  the	  making	  of	  history	  in	  The	  Eighteenth	  Brumaire,	  we	  might	  understand	  Said	  as	  attempting	  to	  
articulate	  an	  understanding	  of	  scholarly	  production	  that	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  cognitive	  structures	  within	  which	  scholars	  seek	  to	  exercise	  agency:	  scholars	  produce	  their	  own	  scholarship,	  but	  not	  within	  discursive	  formations	  of	  their	  choosing.	  Indeed	  Said	  holds	  out	  the	  possibility	  that	  individual	  scholars	  can	  elude	  the	  constraints	  of	  discourse	  to	  exercise	  a	  transformational	  impact	  on	  the	  discursive	  formations	  within	  which	  they	  function.	  His	  1993	  Reith	  Lectures	  define	  the	  vocation	  of	  the	  public	  intellectual	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  duty	  to	  search	  for	  relative	  independence	  from	  institutional	  and	  other	  pressures	  to	  function	  ‘as	  exile	  and	  marginal,	  as	  amateur,	  and	  as	  the	  author	  of	  a	  language	  that	  tries	  to	  speak	  the	  truth	  to	  power’	  (Said	  1994b:	  xiii).	  The	  tensions	  between	  these	  views	  of	  truth	  and	  representation	  place	  Said	  in	  an	  ambivalent	  relation	  to	  humanism	  which,	  I	  will	  suggest,	  is	  emblematic	  of	  the	  archive	  of	  anticolonial	  and	  postcolonial	  thought	  more	  generally.	  	  
Blurring	  binaries	  	  	  Perhaps	  most	  productive	  of	  further	  developments	  in	  postcolonialism	  were	  the	  criticisms	  of	  Homi	  Bhabha,	  for	  whom	  Said’s	  notion	  of	  colonial	  discourse	  was	  too	  determining	  and	  univalent	  in	  its	  implication	  that	  power	  was	  possessed	  only	  by	  the	  colonizer.	  If	  Said	  presents	  colonial	  discourse	  as	  a	  totality	  that	  must	  be	  resisted	  from	  outside	  (without	  quite	  explaining	  how	  such	  agency-­‐outside-­‐of-­‐discourse	  is	  possible),	  Bhabha	  sees	  discourse	  as	  itself	  riven	  with	  ambivalence.	  Deploying	  a	  Freudian	  understanding	  of	  ambivalence	  as	  the	  expression	  of	  antithetical	  emotions	  of	  equal	  intensity	  towards	  a	  common	  object,	  Bhabha	  proposes	  a	  view	  of	  colonial	  discourse	  as	  ‘negotiation	  rather	  than	  negation’,	  reading	  the	  antagonistic	  or	  contradictory	  elements	  within	  it	  as	  ‘a	  dialectic	  without	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  teleological	  or	  transcendent	  History’	  (Bhabha	  1994:	  37).	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  Said’s	  account	  of	  Orientalism	  as	  replete	  with	  stark	  binaries,	  Bhabha	  reads	  colonial	  stereotypes	  as	  ambivalent	  modes	  of	  representation.	  While	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  stereotype	  is	  to	  construe	  the	  colonized	  as	  a	  population	  of	  degenerate	  racial	  types	  with	  a	  view	  to	  justifying	  conquest,	  exploitation	  and	  ‘civilization’,	  colonial	  stereotypes	  oscillated	  between	  viewing	  the	  native	  as	  fixed,	  unchanging	  and	  timeless	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  as	  disorderly,	  anarchic	  and	  licentious	  on	  the	  other.	  The	  colonial	  fantasy	  both	  proposes	  a	  teleology	  of	  improvement	  in	  which	  under	  certain	  conditions	  of	  colonial	  domination	  the	  native	  is	  progressively	  reformable,	  while	  insisting	  on	  the	  separation	  of	  colonizer	  and	  native	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  latter’s	  irredeemable	  inferiority	  (ibid:	  118).	  In	  Bhabha’s	  reading,	  the	  stereotype	  is	  as	  anxious	  as	  it	  is	  assertive,	  declaring	  what	  is	  ‘known’	  about	  the	  native	  but	  nonetheless	  anxiously	  restating	  this	  knowledge	  as	  if	  it	  can	  never	  be	  confirmed	  but	  only	  reinforced	  through	  constant	  repetition,	  making	  it	  a	  sign	  of	  a	  deeper	  crisis	  of	  authority	  in	  the	  wielding	  of	  colonial	  power	  (Childs	  &	  Williams	  1997:	  128-­‐9).	  	  This	  crisis	  becomes	  more	  evident	  in	  Bhabha’s	  discussion	  of	  mimicry,	  which	  also	  inaugurates	  a	  tendency	  in	  postcolonialism	  towards	  the	  blurring	  of	  imperial	  binaries.	  Mimicry,	  in	  Bhabha’s	  view,	  begins	  as	  a	  colonial	  strategy	  of	  power/knowledge	  that	  seeks	  the	  inclusion	  of	  an	  authorized	  ‘good’	  native,	  with	  a	  view	  to	  excluding	  ‘bad’	  
natives	  (for	  a	  contemporary	  illustration	  in	  the	  context	  of	  US	  imperial	  policy	  see	  Mamdani	  2005).	  Exemplified	  by	  Lord	  Macaulay’s	  desire,	  articulated	  in	  his	  infamous	  1835	  Minute	  on	  Indian	  Education,	  ‘to	  form	  a	  class	  who	  may	  be	  interpreters	  between	  us	  and	  the	  millions	  whom	  we	  govern;	  a	  class	  of	  persons,	  Indian	  in	  blood	  and	  colour,	  but	  English	  in	  taste,	  in	  opinions,	  in	  morals,	  and	  in	  intellect’,	  the	  strategy	  of	  mimicry	  is	  ambivalent	  in	  its	  desire	  to	  remake	  the	  colonized	  in	  the	  image	  of	  the	  colonizer	  without	  producing	  so	  close	  a	  resemblance	  as	  to	  threaten	  the	  racial	  and	  other	  hierarchies	  on	  which	  imperialism	  was	  premised.	  The	  difficulty	  of	  maintaining	  this	  balance	  means	  that	  ‘the	  ambivalence	  of	  colonial	  authority	  repeatedly	  turns	  from	  mimicry—a	  difference	  that	  is	  almost	  nothing	  but	  not	  quite—to	  menace—a	  difference	  that	  is	  almost	  total	  but	  not	  quite’	  (Bhabha	  1994:	  131).	  Crucially,	  Bhabha	  makes	  visible	  the	  subversion	  inherent	  in	  mimicry,	  not	  by	  delineating	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  the	  colonized	  but	  through	  an	  account	  of	  ambivalence	  and	  equivocation	  in	  colonial	  strategies	  of	  power,	  so	  that	  mimicry	  becomes—in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  Robert	  Young	  (2004:	  188)—‘a	  kind	  of	  agency	  without	  a	  subject,	  a	  form	  of	  representation	  which	  produces	  effects,	  a	  sameness	  which	  slips	  into	  otherness,	  but	  which	  still	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  any	  “other”’.	  The	  menace	  in	  mimicry	  is	  not	  a	  deliberate	  strategy	  employed	  by	  the	  colonized,	  but	  an	  effect	  of	  the	  colonizer’s	  own	  discourse:	  we	  might	  say,	  with	  David	  Huddart	  (2008:	  60-­‐1),	  that	  the	  colonizer	  ‘spooks	  himself’.	  	  	  It	  is	  in	  his	  writings	  on	  the	  messy,	  compromised	  process	  of	  religious	  conversion	  in	  colonial	  India	  that	  Bhabha	  makes	  some	  of	  his	  most	  acute	  observations.	  Analyzing	  British	  missionary	  Charles	  Grant’s	  1792	  proposal	  for	  mission	  education	  in	  English	  in	  India,	  Bhabha	  describes	  how	  the	  tension	  between	  Grant’s	  desire	  for	  religious	  reform	  and	  anxiety	  that	  this	  could	  make	  Indians	  restive	  for	  liberty	  resulted	  in	  a	  policy	  whereby	  Christian	  doctrine	  would	  collude	  with	  indigenous	  caste	  practices	  to	  keep	  the	  subject	  population	  divided,	  thereby	  illustrating	  how	  in	  the	  very	  practice	  of	  domination	  the	  language	  of	  the	  master	  becomes	  hybrid	  and	  perverts	  its	  professed	  moral	  project	  (1994:	  124).	  In	  a	  move	  that	  begins	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  agency	  of	  the	  colonized,	  Bhabha	  finds	  in	  the	  archives	  of	  nineteenth	  century	  Christian	  missionaries	  in	  India,	  an	  obstinate	  native	  insistence	  on	  engaging	  with	  the	  missionaries	  on	  their	  own	  terms.	  Bringing	  their	  denied	  knowledges	  of	  indigenous	  religion,	  magic	  and	  superstition	  to	  this	  encounter,	  native	  converts	  accept	  the	  Bible	  as	  the	  word	  of	  God,	  but	  also	  decouple	  it	  from	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  English	  as	  religious,	  cultural	  and	  linguistic	  mediators.	  As	  such,	  the	  ‘native’	  Bible	  must	  be	  located	  in	  a	  separate	  hybrid	  space	  of	  colonial	  discourse	  which,	  in	  Bhabha’s	  view,	  ‘has	  been	  systematically	  denied	  by	  both	  colonialists	  and	  nationalists	  who	  have	  sought	  authority	  in	  the	  authenticity	  of	  “origins”’	  (ibid:	  171).	  The	  effect	  of	  colonial	  power,	  for	  Bhabha,	  then,	  is	  ‘the	  production	  of	  hybridization	  rather	  than	  the	  noisy	  command	  of	  colonialist	  authority	  or	  the	  silent	  repression	  of	  native	  traditions’.	  The	  realization	  that	  colonial	  power	  never	  quite	  gets	  what	  it	  wants	  ‘enables	  a	  form	  of	  subversion,	  founded	  on	  the	  undecidability	  that	  turns	  the	  discursive	  conditions	  of	  dominance	  into	  the	  grounds	  of	  intervention’	  (ibid:	  160).	  	  Importantly,	  in	  Bhabha’s	  view,	  ambivalence	  is	  a	  feature	  not	  only	  of	  colonial	  but	  also	  postcolonial	  discourses	  of	  authority.	  His	  writings	  on	  the	  nation	  explore	  the	  
numerous	  dissonances	  in	  discourses	  of	  national	  culture.	  While	  these	  are	  often	  clearly	  apparent	  in	  a	  spatial	  sense	  in	  the	  discourses	  of	  minorities	  that	  challenge	  hegemonic	  narratives	  of	  national	  homogeneity,	  Bhabha	  is	  particularly	  interested	  in	  the	  dissonances	  that	  haunt	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  temporal	  process.	  Drawing	  attention	  to	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  ‘double	  and	  split	  time’	  of	  the	  nation,	  he	  observes	  that	  ‘the	  people’	  in	  discursive	  strategies	  of	  the	  nation	  are	  doubled	  as	  both	  its	  past	  and	  present—they	  are	  both	  ‘the	  historical	  “objects”	  of	  a	  nationalist	  pedagogy,	  giving	  the	  discourse	  an	  authority	  that	  is	  based	  on	  the	  pre-­‐given	  or	  constituted	  historical	  origin	  in	  the	  past’	  and	  ‘the	  “subjects”	  of	  a	  process	  of	  signification	  that	  must	  erase	  any	  prior	  or	  originary	  presence	  of	  the	  nation-­‐people	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  prodigious,	  living	  principles	  of	  the	  people	  as	  contemporaneity:	  as	  that	  sign	  of	  the	  present	  through	  which	  national	  life	  is	  redeemed	  and	  iterated	  as	  a	  reproductive	  process’.	  As	  such,	  the	  narration	  of	  the	  nation	  is	  split	  between	  ‘the	  continuist,	  accumulative	  temporality	  of	  the	  pedagogical,	  and	  the	  repetitious,	  recursive	  strategy	  of	  the	  performative’	  (ibid:	  208-­‐9).	  Indeed,	  the	  history	  of	  the	  postcolonial	  nation	  can	  be	  read	  as	  the	  incessant	  interruption	  of	  the	  pedagogical	  by	  the	  performative,	  so	  that	  ‘national	  culture’	  can	  only	  ever	  be	  articulated	  as	  the	  dialectic	  of	  these	  temporalities	  and	  never	  as	  a	  knowledge	  that	  is	  stabilized	  in	  its	  enunciation	  because	  it	  is	  always	  contemporaneous	  with	  the	  act	  of	  recitation	  (ibid:	  218-­‐9).	  	  There	  is	  now	  a	  formidable	  body	  of	  postcolonial	  scholarship	  that	  independently,	  or	  under	  the	  influence,	  of	  Bhabha,	  builds	  on	  the	  impulse	  against	  imperial	  binarism	  and	  towards	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  hybrid	  cultural	  formations	  resulting	  from	  the	  colonial	  encounter.	  Pioneering	  a	  technique	  that	  he	  calls	  ‘contrapuntal	  reading’	  in	  which	  cultural	  identities	  are	  conceived,	  not	  as	  essentializations,	  but	  as	  contrapuntal	  ensembles	  in	  which	  identities	  cannot	  exist	  without	  an	  array	  of	  opposites,	  Said’s	  




Subaltern	  speech	  	  	  The	  postcolonial	  impulse	  towards	  a	  critique	  of	  both	  imperialist	  and	  nationalist	  narratives	  also	  finds	  expression	  in	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Subaltern	  Studies	  collective	  of	  historians	  of	  South	  Asia.	  Its	  leading	  figure,	  Ranajit	  Guha,	  criticized	  both	  colonialist	  and	  bourgeois	  nationalist	  historiography	  for	  their	  assumption	  that	  the	  development	  of	  political	  and	  national	  consciousness	  in	  India	  was	  a	  predominantly	  elite	  achievement,	  and	  for	  their	  failure	  to	  adequately	  theorize	  the	  mass	  character	  of	  nationalism.	  The	  collective	  has	  been	  animated	  by	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  history	  and	  politics	  of	  those	  social	  groups	  that	  Gramsci	  (1971:	  52-­‐5)	  described	  as	  ‘subaltern’—non-­‐hegemonic	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  peasants	  of	  southern	  Italy,	  who	  were	  thought	  to	  lack	  a	  social	  and	  political	  consciousness	  of	  themselves	  as	  a	  class.	  In	  the	  work	  of	  Subaltern	  Studies	  historians,	  the	  term	  has	  been	  interpreted	  more	  broadly	  to	  describe	  a	  ‘general	  attribute	  of	  subordination	  in	  South	  Asian	  society	  whether	  this	  is	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  class,	  caste,	  age,	  gender	  and	  office	  or	  in	  any	  other	  way’	  (Guha	  1994:	  vii).	  	  The	  most	  profound	  challenge	  confronting	  subaltern	  studies	  has	  been	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  ‘read’	  subaltern	  consciousness	  from	  archives	  that	  largely	  record	  the	  perspectives	  of	  elites.	  While	  acknowledging	  in	  his	  study	  of	  peasant	  insurgency	  in	  colonial	  India	  that	  he	  has	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  archives	  of	  counterinsurgency	  in	  which	  policemen,	  soldiers,	  bureaucrats,	  landlords	  and	  other	  authorities	  register	  their	  hostility	  to	  insurgency,	  Guha	  nonetheless	  insists	  that	  counterinsurgency	  ‘derives	  directly	  from	  insurgency	  and	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  latter	  in	  all	  that	  is	  essential	  to	  its	  form	  and	  articulation	  [and]	  can	  hardly	  afford	  a	  discourse	  that	  is	  not	  fully	  and	  compulsively	  involved	  with	  the	  rebel	  and	  his	  activities’	  (1992:	  15).	  This	  means	  that	  although	  the	  archives	  overwhelmingly	  represent	  the	  will	  of	  colonial	  counterinsurgents,	  they	  do	  not	  derive	  their	  content	  from	  that	  will	  alone,	  for	  it	  is	  predicated	  on	  another	  will—that	  of	  the	  insurgents—leading	  Guha	  to	  conclude	  that	  it	  should	  be	  possible	  to	  read	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  rebel	  consciousness	  as	  a	  necessary	  and	  pervasive	  element	  within	  the	  archive	  of	  counterinsurgency.	  	  While	  the	  collective	  has	  gone	  on	  to	  publish	  a	  number	  of	  volumes,	  it	  is	  the	  critique	  of	  the	  very	  enterprise	  of	  subaltern	  studies	  that	  has	  generated	  some	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  statements	  in	  postcolonial	  studies,	  particularly	  on	  questions	  of	  subaltern	  agency,	  representation	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  intellectual.	  From	  a	  position	  of	  poststructuralist	  scepticism	  of	  coherent	  identities	  as	  effects	  of	  dominant	  discourses,	  Gayatri	  Chakravorty	  Spivak—herself	  a	  member	  of	  the	  collective—has	  questioned	  whether	  in	  attempting	  to	  reinscribe	  a	  subaltern	  consciousness	  in	  the	  archive,	  subaltern	  historians	  might	  unwittingly	  ‘“insidiously	  objectify”	  the	  subaltern,	  control	  him	  through	  knowledge	  even	  as	  they	  restore	  versions	  of	  causality	  and	  self-­‐determination	  to	  him’	  (1988b:	  201).	  Yet	  despite	  expressing	  discomfort	  with	  the	  self-­‐presentation	  of	  the	  subaltern	  studies	  project	  as	  a	  positivist	  and	  essentializing	  
endeavour,	  she	  argues	  that	  the	  actual	  practice	  of	  the	  collective—driven	  as	  it	  is	  to	  articulating	  subaltern	  consciousness	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  difference	  from	  elite	  interests—is	  deeply	  Derridean	  in	  its	  implicit	  recognition	  that	  signs	  have	  meaning	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  difference	  from	  other	  signs.	  It	  is	  this,	  coupled	  with	  her	  approval	  of	  the	  political	  agenda	  of	  the	  project	  as	  an	  ‘attempt	  to	  undo	  a	  massive	  historiographic	  metalepsis’	  that	  leads	  her	  to	  offer	  a	  qualified	  endorsement	  of	  subaltern	  studies	  as	  ‘a	  strategic	  use	  of	  positivist	  essentialism	  in	  a	  scrupulously	  visible	  political	  interest’	  (ibid:	  205).	  This	  phrase	  has	  taken	  on	  a	  life	  of	  its	  own	  in	  postcolonial	  studies,	  coming	  to	  be	  read	  as	  a	  slogan	  for	  the	  field’s	  broader	  attempt	  to	  draw	  from	  the	  seemingly	  incompatible	  heritages	  of	  Marxism	  and	  poststructuralism.	  I	  shall	  return	  to	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  in	  the	  final	  section	  of	  the	  chapter.	  	  	  Spivak’s	  critique	  of	  the	  pretensions	  of	  intellectuals	  to	  represent	  the	  disenfranchised	  is	  most	  powerfully	  articulated	  in	  an	  oft-­‐misunderstood	  article	  entitled	  ‘Can	  the	  Subaltern	  Speak?’	  (1988a;	  for	  a	  good	  discussion	  see	  Morton	  2003:	  56-­‐68).	  Central	  to	  this	  work	  is	  a	  scepticism	  of	  claims	  of	  representation,	  whether	  they	  emanate	  from	  radical	  intellectuals	  in	  the	  academy	  (here	  Spivak	  takes	  aim	  at	  Foucault	  and	  Deleuze)	  or	  governments	  professing	  to	  use	  power	  in	  the	  defence	  of	  the	  powerless	  (her	  example	  here	  is	  that	  of	  British	  imperialists	  purporting	  to	  rescue	  Indian	  women	  from	  the	  native	  custom	  of	  sati—widow	  burning	  on	  the	  funeral	  pyres	  of	  their	  husbands).	  Spivak	  suggests	  that	  the	  apparent	  benevolence	  of	  these	  varied	  manifestations	  of	  the	  representation/rescue	  impulse	  can	  mask	  an	  appropriation	  and	  silencing	  of	  subaltern	  voice	  when	  the	  powerful	  claim	  to	  represent	  subalterns.	  Importantly,	  she	  contrasts	  two	  meanings	  of	  representation—representation	  as	  ‘speaking	  for’,	  as	  in	  politics,	  and	  representation	  as	  ‘re-­‐presentation’,	  as	  in	  art	  and	  philosophy.	  Drawing	  on	  Marx’s	  Eighteenth	  Brumaire—a	  text	  in	  which	  he	  distinguishes	  these	  connotations	  through	  the	  use	  of	  distinct	  German	  words	  (vertreten	  for	  political	  and	  darstellen	  for	  aesthetic	  representation	  respectively)—Spivak	  warns	  of	  the	  dangers	  of	  conflation	  of	  these	  distinct	  notions	  of	  representation	  in	  intellectual	  and	  political	  endeavours	  that	  profess	  an	  emancipatory	  agenda:	  the	  aesthetic	  re-­‐presentation	  of	  subaltern	  groups	  as	  coherent	  political	  subjects	  can	  often	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  straightforward	  expression	  of	  their	  political	  interests.	  	  	  Spivak	  concludes	  the	  article	  with	  a	  story	  that	  is	  intended	  to	  drive	  home	  the	  impossibility	  of	  subaltern	  speech.	  She	  describes	  the	  suicide	  of	  a	  woman	  named	  Bhuvaneswari	  Bhaduri	  in	  Calcutta	  in	  1926.	  Nearly	  a	  decade	  after	  her	  death,	  it	  was	  discovered	  that	  she	  had	  been	  part	  of	  the	  armed	  struggle	  for	  Indian	  independence	  and	  had	  killed	  herself	  because	  of	  her	  inability	  to	  carry	  out	  an	  assassination	  that	  had	  been	  entrusted	  to	  her.	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  subvert	  the	  typical	  attribution	  of	  such	  deaths	  to	  illegitimate	  passion,	  Bhaduri	  had	  waited	  for	  the	  onset	  of	  menstruation	  before	  she	  killed	  herself.	  Despite	  this	  and	  notwithstanding	  the	  evidence	  that	  later	  became	  available,	  her	  family	  clung	  to	  the	  narrative	  of	  illicit	  love	  by	  way	  of	  explanation.	  For	  Spivak,	  the	  incident	  suggests	  that	  even	  when	  the	  subaltern	  makes	  an	  effort	  to	  the	  death	  to	  represent	  herself,	  it	  does	  not	  fulfil	  itself	  in	  an	  intersubjective	  speech	  act.	  Defending	  herself	  against	  critics	  who	  misread	  her	  as	  suggesting	  that	  subalterns	  are	  mute	  and	  unable	  to	  represent	  themselves,	  Spivak	  has	  insisted	  that	  the	  issue	  has	  
never	  been	  whether	  subalterns	  can	  talk	  (they	  can),	  but	  whether	  their	  utterances	  are	  intelligible	  in	  relationships	  of	  power	  (1996:	  287-­‐90).	  Perhaps	  the	  challenge	  for	  subaltern	  studies	  has	  always	  been	  ‘can	  the	  bourgeois	  theorist	  hear?’	  	  	  Spivak’s	  critique	  of	  the	  gender-­‐blindness	  of	  early	  work	  in	  subaltern	  studies	  coupled	  with	  her	  incisive	  interventions	  in	  discourses	  that	  purport	  to	  emancipate	  women	  have	  worked	  to	  make	  space	  for	  postcolonial	  feminism.	  A	  full	  account	  of	  the	  insights	  of	  postcolonial	  feminism	  is	  impossible	  in	  a	  chapter	  of	  this	  length.	  Nonetheless,	  Spivak’s	  description	  of	  nineteenth	  century	  British	  colonial	  officials	  professing	  to	  save	  Indian	  women	  from	  the	  custom	  of	  sati—‘white	  men	  saving	  brown	  women	  from	  brown	  men’	  (1988a:	  297)—usefully	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  differently	  situated	  actors	  implicated	  in	  transnational	  colonial	  and	  postcolonial	  discourses	  of	  feminism,	  and	  signals	  the	  trajectories	  of	  subsequent	  scholarship.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  white	  men,	  gestures	  such	  as	  sati	  prohibition	  enabled	  imperialism	  to	  represent	  itself	  as	  the	  establisher	  of	  the	  good	  society	  by	  espousing	  women	  as	  objects	  of	  protection	  from	  their	  own	  racial	  and	  national	  kind	  (for	  a	  contemporary	  illustration	  of	  this	  dynamic	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  queer	  theory	  see	  Puar	  2007).	  Elsewhere,	  Spivak	  offers	  a	  literary	  account	  of	  the	  implication	  of	  white	  women	  in	  imperialism	  through	  a	  reading	  of	  Charlotte	  Brontë’s	  Jane	  Eyre.	  Noting	  that	  Bertha	  Mason,	  the	  mad	  Creole	  first	  wife	  of	  Mr.	  Rochester	  ‘has	  to	  set	  fire	  to	  the	  house	  and	  kill	  herself,	  so	  that	  Jane	  Eyre	  can	  become	  the	  feminist	  individualist	  heroine	  of	  British	  fiction’,	  Spivak	  reads	  this	  ‘as	  an	  allegory	  of	  the	  general	  epistemic	  violence	  of	  imperialism,	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  self-­‐immolating	  colonial	  subject	  for	  the	  glorification	  of	  the	  social	  mission	  of	  the	  colonizer’	  (1999:	  127).	  A	  great	  deal	  of	  postcolonial	  feminism	  is	  devoted	  to	  elaborating	  the	  historical	  and	  contemporary	  processes	  by	  which	  Third	  World	  women	  were	  constructed	  as	  abject,	  oppressed	  and	  in	  need	  of	  saving,	  as	  a	  means	  of	  consolidating	  white	  Western	  women	  as	  fully	  formed	  subjects	  epitomizing	  modernity	  and	  progress	  (Grewal	  1996;	  Mohanty	  2003).	  	  	  The	  brown	  man’s	  interests	  become	  visible	  in	  Chatterjee’s	  (1993)	  gendered	  account	  of	  the	  split	  consciousness	  of	  anti-­‐colonial	  nationalism,	  whereby	  men	  became	  agents	  of	  mimicry	  of	  the	  West’s	  material	  modernity,	  while	  women	  were	  required	  to	  function	  as	  repositories	  of	  the	  East’s	  spiritual	  superiority.	  This	  gendered	  division	  of	  labour	  would	  bequeath	  a	  legacy	  in	  which	  any	  attempted	  transformations	  of	  gender	  relations	  via	  discourses	  of	  feminism	  or,	  more	  recently,	  queer	  activism	  have	  come	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  encroachments	  on	  the	  sovereign	  terrain	  of	  the	  nation	  (Rao	  2010:	  101).	  Finally,	  the	  silence	  of	  the	  brown	  woman	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Spivak’s	  example	  of	  sati	  prohibition,	  receives	  its	  fullest	  elaboration	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Lata	  Mani	  (1998)	  who	  argues	  that	  women	  were	  neither	  subjects	  nor	  objects	  but	  the	  grounds	  or	  sites	  on	  which	  tradition	  was	  contested	  and	  reformulated	  in	  debates	  between	  male	  colonial	  officials	  and	  indigenous	  elites.	  Thus,	  in	  common	  with	  subaltern	  studies,	  postcolonial	  feminism	  has	  worked	  to	  fracture	  monolithic	  images	  of	  the	  colonized	  and	  to	  elaborate	  more	  complex	  hierarchies	  of	  domination	  and	  subordination.	  	  	  While	  subaltern	  studies	  originated	  as	  an	  argument	  within	  Indian	  Marxism,	  it	  has	  also	  questioned	  central	  assumptions	  of	  Marxist	  historiography.	  In	  particular,	  it	  has	  
registered	  difficulties	  with	  Marxist	  modes	  of	  production	  narratives	  that	  chart	  transitions	  from	  feudalism	  to	  capitalism	  and	  so	  on	  in	  ways	  that	  reflect	  the	  history	  of	  Western	  Europe,	  but	  cannot	  adequately	  theorize	  situations	  in	  which	  capitalism	  fails	  to	  effect	  these	  transitions	  completely.	  When	  Marxists	  encounter	  locations	  such	  as	  these,	  featuring	  social	  groups	  that	  do	  not	  mobilize	  along	  class	  lines,	  or	  whose	  collective	  life	  features	  gods,	  spirits,	  and	  supernatural	  agents	  in	  worlds	  that	  have	  yet	  to	  become	  disenchanted,	  they	  have	  tended	  to	  relegate	  such	  phenomena	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  false	  consciousness	  and	  to	  the	  time	  of	  the	  pre-­‐political,	  viewing	  them	  as	  anachronistic	  relics	  of	  another	  time.	  Dipesh	  Chakrabarty	  (2000)	  suggests	  that	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  anachronism—by	  no	  means	  unique	  to	  Marxism	  but	  intelligible	  to	  all	  forms	  of	  historicist	  thinking—assumes	  an	  underlying	  unity	  of	  historical	  time:	  one	  that	  is	  singular,	  homogeneous	  and	  secular,	  in	  which	  (most	  of)	  the	  world	  (barring	  its	  non-­‐modern	  holdouts)	  is	  located	  by	  the	  historian,	  regardless	  of	  the	  understanding	  of	  time	  held	  by	  the	  societies	  s/he	  is	  studying.	  Arguing	  that	  such	  historicist	  thinking	  is	  imperialist	  in	  its	  imposition	  of	  a	  single	  notion	  of	  time	  on	  the	  world,	  Chakrabarty	  proposes	  that	  rather	  than	  viewing	  the	  world	  outside	  Europe	  as	  having	  made	  an	  incomplete	  transition	  to	  modernity,	  we	  begin	  to	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  heterotemporality	  of	  modernity.	  Acknowledging	  that	  subaltern	  histories	  cannot	  avoid	  being	  constructed	  within	  the	  master	  code	  of	  history,	  he	  nonetheless	  insists	  that	  they	  cannot	  afford	  to	  grant	  this	  master	  code	  its	  claim	  of	  being	  a	  natural	  and	  universal	  mode	  of	  thought.	  The	  task	  for	  subaltern	  histories,	  as	  he	  sees	  it,	  is	  ‘to	  ask	  how	  this	  seemingly	  imperious,	  all-­‐pervasive	  code	  might	  be	  deployed	  or	  thought	  about	  so	  that	  we	  have	  at	  least	  a	  glimpse	  of	  its	  own	  finitude,	  a	  glimpse	  of	  what	  might	  constitute	  an	  outside	  to	  it’,	  and	  further,	  ‘to	  hold	  history,	  the	  discipline,	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  memory	  together	  so	  that	  they	  can	  help	  in	  the	  interrogation	  of	  each	  other,	  to	  work	  out	  the	  ways	  these	  immiscible	  forms	  of	  recalling	  the	  past	  are	  juxtaposed	  in	  our	  negotiations	  of	  modern	  institutions,	  to	  question	  the	  narrative	  strategies	  in	  academic	  history	  that	  allow	  its	  secular	  temporality	  the	  appearance	  of	  successfully	  assimilating	  to	  itself	  memories	  that	  are,	  strictly	  speaking,	  unassimilable’	  (ibid:	  93-­‐4).	  It	  is	  evident	  from	  a	  manifesto	  of	  this	  kind	  that	  the	  agenda	  of	  subaltern	  studies	  and	  postcolonialism	  more	  generally—sometimes	  simplistically	  construed	  as	  that	  of	  including	  the	  excluded	  subaltern—has	  far	  more	  profound	  epistemological	  consequences	  that	  is	  often	  recognized.	  	  	  	  
	  
II:	  Against	  postcolonialism	  	  	  By	  the	  early	  1990s,	  the	  contours	  of	  postcolonialism	  had	  become	  clear	  enough	  for	  Bhabha	  to	  offer	  the	  following	  confident	  assessment:	  	  	   The	  postcolonial	  perspective…departs	  from	  the	  traditions	  of	  the	  sociology	  of	  underdevelopment	  or	  ‘dependency’	  theory.	  As	  a	  mode	  of	  analysis,	  it	  attempts	  to	  revise	  those	  nationalist	  or	  ‘nativist’	  pedagogies	  that	  set	  up	  the	  relation	  of	  Third	  World	  and	  First	  World	  in	  a	  binary	  structure	  of	  opposition.	  The	  postcolonial	  perspective	  resists	  the	  attempt	  at	  holistic	  forms	  of	  social	  explanation.	  It	  forces	  a	  recognition	  of	  the	  more	  complex	  cultural	  and	  political	  
boundaries	  that	  exist	  on	  the	  cusp	  of	  these	  often	  opposed	  political	  spheres.	  It	  is	  from	  this	  hybrid	  location	  of	  cultural	  value—the	  transnational	  as	  the	  translational—that	  the	  postcolonial	  intellectual	  attempts	  to	  elaborate	  a	  historical	  and	  literary	  project…the	  encounters	  and	  negotiations	  of	  differential	  meanings	  and	  values	  within	  ‘colonial	  textuality’,	  its	  governmental	  discourses	  and	  cultural	  practices,	  have	  anticipated,	  avant	  la	  
lettre,	  many	  of	  the	  problematics	  of	  contemporary	  theory—aporia,	  ambivalence,	  indeterminacy,	  the	  question	  of	  discursive	  closure,	  the	  threat	  to	  agency,	  the	  status	  of	  intentionality,	  the	  challenge	  to	  ‘totalizing’	  concepts,	  to	  name	  but	  a	  few	  (Bhabha	  1994:	  248).	  	  	  While	  this	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  definition	  of	  postcolonialism	  with	  which	  all	  those	  identified	  with	  it	  might	  agree,	  the	  crystallization	  of	  postcolonial	  thought	  in	  these	  terms	  does	  much	  to	  explain	  the	  onslaught	  to	  which	  it	  was	  subject.	  Indeed,	  Bhabha’s	  major	  work	  The	  Location	  of	  Culture	  (1994)	  neatly	  divides	  early	  critiques	  of	  postcolonialism	  that	  accused	  it	  of	  being	  too	  nativist	  (Appiah	  1991:	  354)	  from	  later	  ones	  that	  berate	  it	  for	  almost	  exactly	  the	  opposite	  reason.	  Thus,	  Benita	  Parry	  (2004)	  has	  strenuously	  objected	  to	  what	  she	  sees	  as	  postcolonialism’s	  insistent	  critique	  of	  the	  nativism	  of	  anticolonial	  liberation	  movements	  and	  its	  concomitant	  valorization	  of	  hybridity	  and	  synthesis,	  arguing	  that	  this	  relies	  on	  a	  highly	  selective	  reading	  of	  the	  anticolonial	  archive.	  In	  a	  close	  reading	  of	  Bhabha’s	  oeuvre,	  she	  questions	  whether	  the	  putative	  ‘ambivalence’	  of	  colonial	  discourse	  matters	  very	  much,	  given	  that	  it	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  inhibit	  the	  drive	  to	  mastery	  and	  domination,	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  longevity,	  of	  colonial	  authority	  virtually	  everywhere	  it	  prevailed	  (see	  also	  JanMohamed	  1985).	  She	  disputes	  Bhabha’s	  reconceptualization	  of	  the	  colonial	  relationship	  as	  agonistic	  rather	  than	  antagonistic,	  arguing	  that	  this	  seems	  to	  imply	  a	  competition	  amongst	  peers	  rather	  than	  the	  brutal,	  often	  existential,	  material	  struggle	  between	  unequally	  placed	  adversaries	  that	  the	  documentary	  record	  suggests	  (Parry	  2004:	  62-­‐3).	  	  	  For	  all	  its	  Marxist	  critics	  (Ahmad	  1994;	  Dirlik	  1994;	  Lazarus	  2002,	  2004;	  Parry	  2004),	  the	  fundamental	  problem	  with	  postcolonialism	  lies	  in	  its	  repudiation	  of	  the	  foundational	  role	  of	  capitalism	  in	  history.	  This	  repudiation—although	  far	  from	  total,	  as	  I	  will	  go	  on	  to	  suggest	  in	  the	  following	  section—is	  a	  function	  of	  postcolonialism’s	  critique	  of	  the	  Eurocentrism	  of	  all	  forms	  of	  historicism,	  manifest	  in	  the	  temporal	  teleologies	  of	  narratives	  of	  progress,	  whether	  in	  the	  guise	  of	  the	  ‘modernization’	  or	  ‘modes	  of	  production’	  stories	  central	  to	  bourgeois	  nationalism	  and	  Marxism	  respectively.	  Lazarus	  (2002:	  54)	  sees	  the	  postcolonial	  focus	  on	  the	  cultural	  dimensions	  of	  the	  colonial	  encounter	  as	  a	  ‘bracketing,	  displacement,	  or	  euphemization	  of	  the	  specific	  agency	  of	  capitalist	  social	  relations	  in	  imperialist	  development’	  that	  leaves	  postcolonial	  theorists	  unable	  to	  explain	  what	  distinguished	  Eurocentrism	  from	  other	  forms	  of	  ethnocentrism	  with	  such	  devastating	  consequences	  for	  the	  world.	  Postcolonial	  theorists	  stand	  accused	  of	  ignoring	  the	  conceptual	  resources	  within	  Marxism	  that	  have	  long	  sought	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  very	  problems	  they	  have	  diagnosed—work	  on	  ‘combined	  and	  uneven	  development’	  that	  seeks	  to	  theorize	  the	  differential	  insertion	  of	  global	  peripheries	  
into	  a	  world	  capitalist	  system,	  a	  long	  tradition	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  material	  ‘base’	  and	  cultural	  ‘superstructure’	  of	  social	  formations,	  and	  the	  efforts	  of	  Third	  World	  Marxists	  to	  ‘translate’	  Western	  Marxism	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  their	  locations	  (for	  an	  exceptional	  postcolonial	  engagement	  with	  these	  questions	  see	  Young	  2001;	  2004).	  As	  Arif	  Dirlik	  (1994:	  342)	  has	  complained,	  rather	  than	  seeking	  to	  engage	  with	  Marxism,	  postcolonial	  theorists	  have	  deconstructed	  and	  decentred	  it	  in	  the	  vocabularies	  of	  poststructuralism.	  Claiming	  to	  repudiate	  the	  universalistic	  pretences	  of	  one	  Eurocentric	  narrative,	  they	  have	  replaced	  it	  with	  another	  First	  World	  language	  claiming	  universal	  epistemological	  relevance.	  Yet	  in	  their	  disavowal	  of	  ‘totalizing’	  theory,	  they	  have	  jettisoned,	  and	  sabotaged,	  the	  conceptual	  resources	  with	  which	  they	  might	  have	  contested	  the	  totalizing	  structures	  of	  capital.	  	  Indeed,	  these	  critics	  detect	  a	  more	  insidious	  logic	  in	  the	  proliferation	  of	  postcolonial	  critique,	  seeing	  it	  as	  expressive	  of	  the	  needs	  of	  late	  capitalism.	  Thus,	  the	  transition	  from	  Fordist	  to	  flexible	  accumulation	  under	  conditions	  of	  neoliberalism	  has	  necessitated	  a	  capitalism	  that	  is	  fluid	  and	  able	  to	  articulate	  itself	  in	  multiple	  cultural	  contexts	  outside	  its	  original	  European	  home	  (one	  has	  only	  to	  glance	  comparatively	  at	  the	  menus	  of	  McDonalds	  outlets	  the	  world	  over	  to	  confirm	  that	  multinational	  capital	  understands	  that	  it	  cannot	  afford	  cultural	  parochialism).	  	  To	  its	  critics,	  postcolonialism	  seems	  to	  affirm	  precisely	  those	  modes	  of	  belonging—fluidity,	  hybridity,	  cosmopolitanism—that	  are	  most	  conducive	  to	  the	  working	  of	  global	  capitalism.	  Not	  coincidentally,	  postcolonialism	  in	  the	  academy	  is	  articulated	  by	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  this	  form	  of	  capitalism—upwardly	  mobile	  immigrants	  from	  the	  high	  bourgeoisies	  of	  former	  colonies	  migrating	  to	  the	  metropolis	  and	  seeking	  employment	  in	  its	  professional	  (including	  university)	  sectors.	  The	  allegation	  here	  is	  two-­‐fold.	  By	  producing	  an	  ideology	  that	  downplays	  class	  in	  favour	  of	  other	  markers	  of	  ‘subalternity’	  the	  purveyors	  of	  postcolonialism	  accord	  themselves	  privileged	  status	  in	  the	  academy	  as	  representatives	  of	  the	  disenfranchised	  (Ahmad	  1994:	  195-­‐7).	  Beyond	  crude	  instrumentality,	  postcolonial	  critics	  also	  stand	  accused	  of	  a	  sort	  of	  epistemological	  solipsism	  in	  projecting	  their	  subjectivities	  onto	  their	  reading	  of	  the	  global	  condition,	  so	  that	  their	  own	  experiences	  of	  migration,	  exile,	  liminality	  and	  multiple	  belonging	  come	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  exemplary	  (Dirlik	  1994:	  339).	  Expressing	  incredulity	  towards	  metanarratives	  they	  have,	  in	  effect,	  elevated	  autobiography	  to	  the	  status	  of	  metanarrative.	  	  	  
III:	  The	  dialectics	  of	  anticolonial	  thought	  	  At	  stake	  in	  the	  dispute	  between	  postcolonialism	  and	  its	  antagonists	  are	  questions	  of	  historical	  interpretation	  (how	  should	  the	  colonial	  encounter	  and	  its	  aftermath	  be	  understood?)	  but	  also	  political	  progress	  (how	  should	  oppression	  and	  liberation	  in	  the	  contemporary	  conjuncture	  be	  theorized	  and	  responded	  to?).	  A	  central	  feature	  of	  these	  debates	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  all	  parties	  refer	  to	  the	  archives	  of	  anticolonial	  liberation	  in	  legitimation	  of	  their	  arguments.	  This	  makes	  it	  imperative	  to	  consider	  
how	  postcolonialism	  is	  related	  to	  that	  archive:	  is	  postcolonialism	  a	  restatement,	  or	  a	  revision,	  of	  the	  protocols	  of	  anticolonial	  liberation?	  	  	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  anticolonial	  activists—irrespective	  of	  ideological	  affiliation—viewed	  imperialism	  as	  a	  totality	  comprising	  economic,	  political,	  military,	  cultural	  and	  psychological	  dimensions	  and	  necessitating	  struggle	  on	  all	  of	  these	  fronts.	  Many	  saw	  the	  cognitive	  dimensions	  of	  imperialism	  as	  even	  more	  fundamental—because	  more	  insidious—than	  its	  more	  obvious	  physical	  manifestations.	  Gandhi	  famously	  excoriated	  his	  countrymen	  for	  wanting	  ‘English	  rule	  without	  the	  Englishman’	  (1938:	  26),	  arguing	  that	  they	  had	  been	  subjugated	  by	  British	  imperialism	  not	  only	  because	  of	  political	  disunity	  but	  also	  because	  of	  their	  moha	  (infatuation)	  for	  British	  civilization,	  and	  warning	  that	  such	  a	  mentality	  would	  perpetuate	  the	  ‘rule’	  of	  British	  civilization	  even	  after	  the	  cessation	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  control	  (Parekh	  1995:	  16-­‐18).	  If	  Marx	  welcomed	  modernity	  but	  questioned	  the	  appropriation	  of	  its	  fruits	  by	  the	  bourgeoisie,	  Gandhi’s	  Hind	  Swaraj	  is	  an	  indictment	  of	  modernity	  itself—but	  one	  whose	  message	  would	  ironically	  be	  disseminated	  via	  the	  quintessentially	  modernist	  technologies	  of	  the	  railways	  and	  mass	  media.	  	  Running	  through	  the	  anticolonial	  archive	  is	  an	  enduring	  tension	  between	  two	  tendencies:	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  an	  acceptance	  of	  the	  terms	  of	  colonial	  discourse	  even	  as	  the	  valuations	  encoded	  within	  these	  are	  reversed;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  refusal	  of	  those	  terms	  altogether.	  Ashis	  Nandy	  (1988)	  provides	  a	  number	  of	  examples	  of	  this	  tension	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Indian	  anticolonial	  thought.	  Thus	  he	  contrasts	  the	  resistance	  efforts	  of	  nineteenth	  century	  writers	  such	  as	  Bankim	  Chandra	  Chattopadhyay	  whose	  reinterpretations	  of	  Hindu	  texts	  projected	  on	  to	  the	  Hindu	  past	  the	  qualities	  of	  Christianity	  that	  seemed	  to	  give	  it	  strength—a	  process	  that	  has	  been	  described	  as	  the	  ‘semitization’	  of	  Hinduism—with	  Gandhi’s	  less	  defensive	  willingness	  to	  grant	  Hinduism	  its	  open-­‐ended,	  anarchic	  and	  unorganized	  character.	  In	  an	  analogous	  illustration,	  he	  notes	  that	  colonialism	  was	  structured	  around	  a	  homology	  between	  sexual	  and	  political	  dominance	  in	  which	  a	  virile,	  masculinized	  West	  was	  seen	  to	  penetrate	  a	  subservient,	  feminized	  Orient.	  Once	  again,	  he	  contrasts	  earlier	  forms	  of	  anticolonial	  thinking	  and	  praxis	  that	  accept	  the	  colonial	  ordering	  of	  masculine	  as	  superior	  to	  feminine	  and	  respond	  with	  idioms	  of	  protest	  that	  valorize	  indigenous	  forms	  of	  masculinity	  such	  as	  ‘Kshatriyahood’	  (the	  cult	  of	  the	  warrior),	  with	  Gandhi’s	  more	  gender-­‐ambiguous	  cultivation	  of	  self	  (the	  eccentric	  experiments	  with	  celibacy,	  the	  self-­‐description	  as	  ‘God’s	  eunuch’,	  etc.)	  and	  androgynous	  techniques	  of	  ‘passive	  resistance’.	  	  	  This	  tension	  between	  negation	  within	  terms	  derived	  from	  colonial	  discourse,	  and	  the	  deconstruction	  of	  those	  terms,	  is	  also	  visible	  in	  the	  great	  debates	  central	  to	  Pan-­‐Africanist	  thought	  in	  the	  Americas,	  Caribbean	  and	  Africa,	  between	  proponents	  of	  various	  forms	  of	  indigenism,	  and	  advocates	  of	  more	  hybrid	  modes	  of	  belonging	  such	  as	  Creolité,	  Métissage,	  etc.	  (Munro	  &	  Shilliam	  2011).	  Here,	  the	  tension	  between	  derivative	  negation	  and	  deconstructive	  negotiation	  is	  understood	  by	  some	  of	  the	  leading	  figures	  in	  these	  debates	  as	  equally	  necessary	  stages	  in	  a	  historical	  dialectic.	  In	  his	  preface	  to	  a	  1948	  anthology	  of	  African	  and	  West	  Indian	  poetry	  edited	  by	  
Léopold	  Senghor	  (the	  leading	  figure	  in	  the	  black	  nationalist	  ferment	  of	  the	  1930s	  that	  came	  to	  be	  called	  Négritude,	  later	  to	  become	  President	  of	  Senegal),	  Jean-­‐Paul	  Sartre	  describes	  the	  poetry	  of	  Aimé	  Césaire	  in	  the	  stark	  dichotomies	  of	  negation:	  	   It	  is	  not	  a	  question	  of	  the	  poem	  becoming	  part	  of	  the	  calm	  unity	  of	  opposites;	  but	  rather	  of	  making	  one	  of	  the	  opposites	  in	  the	  “black-­‐white”	  couple	  expand	  like	  a	  phallus	  in	  its	  opposition	  to	  the	  other.	  The	  density	  of	  these	  words	  thrown	  into	  the	  air	  like	  stones	  from	  a	  volcano,	  is	  found	  in	  negritude,	  which	  is	  defined	  as	  being	  against	  Europe	  and	  colonization.	  What	  Césaire	  destroys	  is	  not	  all	  culture	  but	  rather	  white	  culture;	  what	  he	  brings	  to	  light	  is	  not	  desire	  for	  everything	  but	  rather	  the	  revolutionary	  aspirations	  of	  the	  oppressed	  negro;	  what	  he	  touches	  in	  his	  very	  depths	  is	  not	  the	  spirit	  but	  a	  certain	  specific,	  concrete	  form	  of	  humanity	  (Sartre	  1964-­‐65:	  33).	  	  	  Sartre	  affirms	  the	  indispensability	  of	  this	  poetic	  negation	  in	  his	  insistence	  that	  ‘this	  anti-­‐racist	  racism	  is	  the	  only	  road	  that	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  abolition	  of	  racial	  differences’	  (ibid:	  18).	  Yet	  even	  as	  he	  does	  so,	  he	  announces	  the	  necessary	  end	  of	  Négritude	  and,	  by	  implication,	  all	  movements	  of	  negation:	  	   …Negritude	  appears	  like	  the	  up-­‐beat…of	  a	  dialectical	  progression:	  the	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  affirmation	  of	  white	  supremacy	  is	  the	  thesis;	  the	  position	  of	  Negritude	  as	  an	  antithetical	  value	  is	  the	  moment	  of	  negativity.	  But	  this	  negative	  moment	  is	  not	  sufficient	  in	  itself,	  and	  these	  black	  men	  who	  use	  it	  know	  this	  perfectly	  well;	  they	  know	  that	  it	  aims	  at	  preparing	  the	  synthesis	  or	  realization	  of	  the	  human	  being	  in	  a	  raceless	  society.	  Thus	  Negritude	  is	  for	  destroying	  itself,	  it	  is	  a	  “crossing	  to”	  and	  not	  an	  “arrival	  at,”	  a	  means	  and	  not	  an	  end	  (ibid:	  49).	  	  	  Irritated	  at	  the	  teleological	  condescension	  of	  the	  European	  Marxist	  who	  has	  effectively	  relegated	  Négritude	  to	  the	  status	  of	  a	  passing	  phase,	  Frantz	  Fanon	  responds	  with	  incredulity	  in	  his	  1952	  work	  Black	  Skin,	  White	  Masks:	  	  	   What?	  I	  have	  barely	  opened	  eyes	  that	  have	  been	  blindfolded,	  and	  someone	  already	  wants	  to	  drown	  me	  in	  the	  universal?	  …	  I	  need	  to	  lose	  myself	  in	  my	  negritude,	  to	  see	  the	  fires,	  the	  segregations,	  the	  repressions,	  the	  rapes,	  the	  discriminations,	  the	  boycotts.	  We	  need	  to	  put	  our	  fingers	  on	  every	  sore	  that	  mottles	  the	  black	  uniform	  (1986:	  186-­‐7).	  	  Yet	  this	  book	  ends	  with	  a	  denial	  of	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  racial	  essences,	  expressing	  the	  author’s	  hope	  that	  ‘it	  may	  be	  possible	  for	  me	  to	  discover	  and	  to	  love	  man,	  wherever	  he	  may	  be.	  The	  Negro	  is	  not.	  Any	  more	  than	  the	  white	  man.’	  (ibid:	  231)	  Moreover,	  in	  a	  move	  that	  recalls	  the	  Sartrean	  dialectic,	  even	  as	  he	  affirms	  Négritude	  as	  an	  indispensable	  insurrectionary	  mode,	  Fanon	  warns	  presciently	  of	  the	  ‘pitfalls	  of	  national	  consciousness’	  in	  his	  1961	  work	  The	  Wretched	  of	  the	  Earth.	  In	  a	  vision	  of	  freedom	  that	  encompasses	  not	  only	  independence	  from	  colonial	  oppression	  but	  also	  liberation	  from	  the	  native	  bourgeoisie,	  Fanon	  insists	  that	  the	  people	  must	  pass	  ‘from	  total,	  undiscriminating	  nationalism	  to	  social	  and	  economic	  awareness’	  if	  they	  are	  to	  
attain	  the	  forms	  of	  consciousness	  with	  which	  to	  challenge	  the	  ossification	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  leader	  and	  party	  into	  instruments	  for	  the	  entrenchment	  of	  native	  capital	  (Fanon	  1967:	  115).	  In	  effect,	  this	  statement	  represents	  a	  logical	  working	  through	  of	  the	  Leninist	  strategy	  of	  temporary	  alliance	  between	  the	  forces	  of	  communism	  and	  anti-­‐colonial	  bourgeois	  nationalism	  in	  the	  worldwide	  struggle	  against	  imperialism,	  as	  first	  articulated	  at	  the	  1920	  Second	  Congress	  of	  the	  Comintern	  (Young	  2001:	  130).	  By	  implication,	  once	  the	  colonizer	  had	  been	  expelled,	  the	  tactical	  alliance	  between	  communists	  and	  bourgeois	  nationalists	  and	  the	  ideological	  consciousness	  of	  nationalism	  through	  which	  it	  had	  been	  forged,	  could	  no	  longer	  serve	  a	  progressive	  purpose.	  As	  such,	  Fanon’s	  early	  disagreement	  with	  Sartre	  is	  best	  interpreted	  as	  one	  about	  not	  the	  direction	  in	  which	  History	  marches,	  so	  much	  as	  the	  speed	  with	  which	  Marxism	  expects	  it	  to	  do	  so	  in	  its	  hurry	  to	  subsume	  all	  forms	  of	  oppression	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  class.	  	  	  Far	  from	  transforming	  it	  into	  a	  ‘reconciliatory	  rather	  than	  a	  critical,	  anti-­‐colonialist	  category’	  as	  argued	  by	  its	  critics	  (During	  1998:	  31),	  we	  can	  see	  postcolonialism’s	  critique	  of	  nativism	  and	  its	  affirmation	  of	  hybridity	  and	  synthesis	  as	  evocative	  of	  the	  most	  subversive	  voices	  in	  the	  anticolonial	  archive.	  From	  a	  materialist	  perspective,	  the	  critique	  of	  nativist	  and	  nationalist	  consciousness,	  while	  cognizant	  of	  its	  necessity	  as	  the	  vehicle	  for	  postcoloniality,	  is	  nonetheless	  entirely	  consistent	  with	  a	  Leninist	  project	  that	  accords	  it	  a	  vital	  but	  temporary	  place	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  consciousness	  conducive	  to	  a	  particular	  stage	  of	  the	  historical	  dialectic.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  the	  debate	  between	  Marxism	  and	  postcolonialism	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  one	  about	  temporality	  within	  the	  terms	  of	  Lenin’s	  dialectic,	  so	  that	  it	  becomes	  possible	  to	  conceive	  of	  postcolonialism	  as	  a	  form	  of	  Marxism:	  the	  debate,	  then,	  is	  one	  about	  whether	  the	  time	  of	  transcendence	  of	  nationalist	  consciousness	  has	  arrived.	  From	  a	  cultural	  perspective,	  postcolonialism	  views	  nativism	  as	  problematic	  because	  of	  its	  tendency	  to	  fight	  the	  colonizer	  within	  the	  terms	  set	  by	  the	  latter:	  it	  is	  a	  reverse	  ethnocentrism	  that	  upends	  the	  hierarchies	  inherent	  within	  colonial	  discourse	  without	  undermining	  the	  notion	  of	  hierarchy	  per	  se.	  As	  Nandy	  eloquently	  puts	  it,	  in	  terms	  that	  resonate	  with	  the	  Sartre-­‐Fanon	  debate:	  	  	   …in	  every	  situation	  of	  organized	  oppression	  the	  true	  antonyms	  are	  always	  the	  exclusive	  part	  versus	  the	  inclusive	  whole—not	  masculinity	  versus	  femininity	  but	  either	  of	  them	  versus	  androgyny,	  not	  the	  past	  versus	  the	  present	  but	  either	  of	  them	  versus	  the	  timelessness	  in	  which	  the	  past	  is	  the	  present	  and	  the	  present	  is	  the	  past,	  not	  the	  oppressor	  versus	  the	  oppressed	  but	  both	  of	  them	  versus	  the	  rationality	  which	  turns	  them	  into	  co-­‐victims…the	  opposite	  of	  thesis	  is	  not	  the	  antithesis	  because	  they	  exclude	  each	  other.	  The	  true	  ‘enemy’	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  in	  the	  synthesis	  because	  it	  includes	  the	  thesis	  and	  ends	  the	  latter’s	  reason	  for	  being	  (Nandy	  1988:	  99).	  	  Yet	  even	  as	  we	  recall	  the	  subversive,	  rather	  than	  reconciliatory,	  potentials	  of	  voices	  of	  synthesis,	  it	  is	  salutary	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  anticolonial	  archive	  is	  a	  space	  of	  debate	  rather	  than	  the	  locus	  of	  a	  singular	  view	  on	  questions	  of	  liberation.	  Confronted	  with	  the	  universalistic	  categories	  of	  colonial	  discourse—‘reason’,	  
‘History’,	  	  ‘human’—anticolonial	  thought	  responds	  in	  at	  least	  three	  registers.	  First,	  there	  is	  the	  register	  of	  reverse	  ethnocentrism,	  which	  accepts	  the	  orientalist	  notion	  of	  a	  native	  essence,	  but	  posits	  this	  as	  superior	  to	  that	  of	  the	  colonizer	  and	  therefore	  as	  having	  a	  stronger	  claim	  to	  the	  mantle	  of	  universality.	  Second,	  there	  is	  the	  register	  of	  synthesis	  which	  looks	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  more	  perfect	  universality	  encompassing	  colonizer	  and	  colonized	  on	  equal	  terms,	  audible	  in	  Césaire’s	  stirring	  insistence	  that	  ‘no	  race	  has	  a	  monopoly	  of	  beauty,	  intelligence,	  strength	  /	  and	  there	  is	  room	  for	  all	  at	  the	  rendez-­‐vous	  of	  conquest’	  (1968:	  125).	  In	  its	  refusal	  of	  the	  constitutive	  terms	  of	  colonial	  discourse,	  this	  second	  register	  begins	  to	  anticipate	  the	  mode	  of	  reading	  that	  we	  would	  now	  call	  deconstruction,	  whilst	  nonetheless	  holding	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  a	  better	  universal.	  But	  third,	  albeit	  more	  infrequently,	  we	  can	  also	  hear—in	  a	  much	  clearer	  anticipation	  of	  poststructuralism—a	  scepticism	  of	  universality	  per	  se.	  When	  James	  Joyce	  has	  a	  character	  in	  A	  Portrait	  of	  the	  Artist	  as	  a	  Young	  Man—a	  novel	  that	  appears	  in	  book	  form	  in	  1916,	  the	  year	  of	  the	  Irish	  Easter	  Uprising—describe	  the	  protagonist	  Stephen	  Dedalus	  as	  a	  ‘born	  sneerer’	  (1965:	  219)	  in	  bewilderment	  at	  the	  latter’s	  disparagement	  of	  quite	  distinct	  campaigns	  for	  world	  peace	  and	  Irish	  freedom,	  we	  might	  read	  this	  as	  a	  literary	  anticipation	  of	  Jean-­‐François	  Lyotard’s	  definition	  of	  the	  postmodern	  condition	  as	  ‘incredulity	  toward	  metanarratives’	  (1984:	  xxiv).	  	  As	  such,	  although	  postcolonialism	  is	  conventionally	  described	  as	  bringing	  the	  tools	  of	  poststructuralism	  to	  the	  terrain	  of	  the	  ‘non-­‐West’—the	  colonization	  of	  which	  had	  hitherto	  been	  understood	  primarily	  in	  terms	  of	  categories	  derived	  from	  Marxism—it	  is	  more	  accurate	  to	  think	  of	  it	  as	  bearing	  the	  inheritance	  of	  the	  anticolonial	  archive,	  which	  itself	  anticipates	  debates	  between	  Marxism	  and	  poststructuralism	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  diverse	  and	  contradictory	  responses	  to	  the	  universalistic	  platitudes	  of	  Western	  humanism	  encoded	  within	  colonial	  discourse.	  Moreover,	  notwithstanding	  the	  tendency	  of	  its	  critics	  to	  portray	  it	  as	  a	  unified	  discourse,	  postcolonialism	  continues	  to	  speak	  in	  the	  dissonant	  registers	  of	  that	  archive.	  Nowhere	  is	  this	  more	  visible	  than	  in	  the	  contrasting	  appropriations	  by	  postcolonial	  theorists	  of	  the	  work	  of	  Fanon,	  who	  can	  himself	  be	  read	  as	  speaking	  in	  multiple	  registers.	  Thus,	  there	  is	  the	  widest	  of	  chasms	  between	  Said’s	  embrace	  of	  the	  universalist	  humanism	  of	  the	  Fanon	  audible	  in	  The	  Wretched	  of	  the	  Earth	  (Said	  1994a:	  278)	  and	  Bhabha’s	  disavowal	  of	  this	  very	  same	  Fanon	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  dialectics	  without	  transcendence,	  a	  ‘politics	  without	  the	  dream	  of	  perfectibility’	  (Bhabha	  1994:	  86-­‐91).	  	  It	  is	  here	  that	  Spivak’s	  endorsement	  of	  ‘a	  strategic	  use	  of	  positivist	  essentialism	  in	  a	  scrupulously	  visible	  political	  interest’	  has	  come	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  way	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  postcolonialism’s	  simultaneous	  pursuit	  of	  both	  humanist	  and	  anti-­‐humanist	  critique.	  If	  Marxists	  worry	  that	  postcolonialism’s	  (poststructuralist-­‐influenced)	  critique	  of	  essentialism	  renders	  impossible	  a	  politics	  of	  solidarity,	  postcolonialism	  might	  respond	  that	  it	  does	  not	  criticize	  essentialism	  per	  se	  but	  the	  persistence	  of	  particular	  essentialisms	  beyond	  the	  time	  of	  their	  strategic	  usefulness.	  Indeed	  Spivak	  has	  acknowledged	  that	  essentialisms—categories	  such	  as	  ‘worker’,	  ‘woman’	  or	  even	  ‘human’—are	  unavoidable	  and	  that	  the	  critique	  of	  essentialism	  should	  be	  understood	  not	  as	  an	  exposure	  of	  error	  but	  as	  ‘an	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  
dangerousness	  of	  something	  one	  cannot	  not	  use’	  (2009:	  5).	  Sitting	  precariously	  between	  the	  humanist	  essentialisms	  of	  emancipatory	  discourses	  such	  as	  Marxism	  and	  nationalism,	  and	  the	  anti-­‐humanist	  interruptions	  of	  poststructuralist	  deconstruction,	  postcolonialism	  can	  legitimately	  claim	  to	  have	  inherited	  the	  archive	  of	  anticolonial	  liberation	  in	  its	  dissonant	  entirety.	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